In this path breaking volume, leading researchers from psychology, linguistics, philosophy and primatology offer complementary perspectives on the role of intersubjectivity in the context of human development, comparative cognition and...

Finding happiness within the inevitable chaos of the world is one of the hardest things you can do. It's also one of the most important. There are lots of challenges in your life, occupying space in your mind and keeping you anxious, depressed, or angry. Mental health TikToker and licensed therapist TJ Hoegh outlines his three rules for chaotic happiness, helping you rise above the fray and claim the contentedness that is yours. With evidence-based advice and more than 30 practical (...) exercises, you'll explore your own psyche, improve the quality of your relationships, and understand the impact of the outside world so you can arrive at your happiest self. (shrink)

I argue that Scotus's formal distinction is a mereological fusion relation rather than an identity relation. I construct mereological models which adequately represent Scotus's theory.

This essay is a critique of medical/clinical ethics from the personal perspective of a medical historian in an academic health science centre who has interacted with ethicists. It calls for greater transparency and accountability of ethicists involved in ‘bedside consulting;’ it questions the wisdom of the four principles of biomedical ethics and their American cultural origins with respect to training; challenges the authority of ‘core competencies’ for ethicists as identified by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; and muses over (...) the apparent reintroduction of religion into clinical medicine through the medium of bioethics. This essay is designed to provoke reflection on the putative ‘professionalism’ of the consulting ethics enterprise for which educational baselines and curricula are not standardized. By analysing sources such as the professional material communicated by the Canadian Bioethics Society, it also critiques the collective ethical shortcoming... (shrink)

Dennett’s story “Where am I?” is used to set up the difficulty of locating the self in the natural world. The story is told from a first-person point of view in which the narrator maintains his identity across exchanges of brain and body, but there is no physical thing in the story that can act as bearer of his identity. The story seems to present a dilemma between Cartesian dualism and Dennett’s a “no-self” view. This chapter argues for a third (...) option. Prepersonal processes in the brain stabilize separable conceptions of self and world out of patterns in sensory information. The conception of self starts out as a mere sensorimotor point of view but gradually develops into something richer. Seeing how the first-person point of view arises is seeing how the self arises, because the self is nothing but the proper subject of a first-person point of view. (shrink)

Let be a class of models with a notion of ‘strong’ submodel and of canonically prime model over an increasing chain. We show under appropriate set-theoretic hypotheses that if K is not smooth , then K has many models in certain cardinalities. On the other hand, if K is smooth, we show that in reasonable cardinalities K has a unique homogeneous-universal model. In this situation we introduce the notion of type and prove the equivalence of saturated with homogeneous-universal.

An ancient doctor who advocated the therapeutic benefits of wine and passive exercise was bound to be successful. However, Asclepiades of Bithynia did far more than reform much of traditional Hippocratic therapeutic practice; he devised an extraordinary physical theory which he used to explain all biological phenomena in uniformly simple terms. His work laid the theoretical basis for the anti-theoretical medical sect called Methodism. For his trouble he was despised by his intellectual progeny and, more importantly perhaps, by Galen. None (...) of his work survives intact, but copious ancient testimonia relating to him allow us to reconstruct many details of the theory. His ideas offer us a fascinating glimpse of how Hellenistic philosophy and medicine interacted, and provide an introduction to one of the most intriguing doctrinal disputes in Greek science. (shrink)

There is a note of uneasiness in many modern appreciations of Sophocles, and particularly of his Electra. A symptom is the familiar apology that, after all, he was the perfect artist. Jebb himself betrays a certain moral discomfort in the midst of his enthusiasm for the brightness of the morning sun that greets the righteous avenger. Professor Murray has the courage to state as a challenge the criticism which less candid writers hint by inuendo. By the very frankness of his (...) indictment he helps us to face, instead of shirking, the issue. Unlike Euripides and Aeschylus, he says, Sophocles takes the story exactly as he finds it. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how Scotus and Ockham try to solve the following problem. If different kinds of constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute, then the divine Father and Son should be different in kind because they are constituted by at least some constituents that are different in kind (namely, fatherhood and sonship). However, if the Father and Son are different in kind, the Son's production will be equivocal, and equivocal products are typically less (...) perfect than their producers. Therefore, the Son must be subordinate to the Father. In response, Scotus argues that different kinds of constituents do not necessarily result in different kinds of things, but Ockham rejects this, arguing instead that although the Father and Son are different in kind, they are still equal in perfection because of their identity with the divine essence. (shrink)

It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.

It has been widely argued that words are analogous to species such that words, like species, are natural kinds. In this paper, I consider the metaphysics of word-kinds. After arguing against an essentialist approach, I argue that word-kinds are homeostatic property clusters, in line with the dominant approach to other biological and psychological kinds.

What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words.